[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-14214
Non-Argument Calendar

D.C. Docket No. 92-00182-CR-4-5-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

GEORGE HIGH,
VIRGINIA C. HIGH,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia

(February 12, 2003)

Before DUBINA, BARKETT and HULL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Appellants Virginia and George High appeal from an order of the district court denying their petition for writ of error *coram nobis*, brought under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1651(a), together with a motion for appointment of counsel and a motion for disqualification of the district court.

We review a denial of *coram nobis* relief for an abuse of discretion. *See United States v. Peter*, 310 F.3d 709, 711 (11th Cir. 2002). "Federal courts have authority to issue a writ of error *coram nobis* under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)." *United States v. Mills*, 221 F.3d 1201, 1203 (11th Cir. 2000), *cert. denied*, 531 U.S. 1144 (2001). "A court's jurisdiction over *coram nobis* petitions is limited to the review of errors of the most fundamental character." *Id.* (citation and quotation omitted). The Highs have not demonstrated "errors of the most fundamental character." We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying their petition.

Next, the Highs argue that they are entitled to have counsel represent them on the writ of error *coram nobis*. "While defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at trial and on direct appeal, they do not have a corresponding right to counsel when collaterally attacking their convictions." *Hill v. Jones*, 81 F.3d 1015, 1024 (11th Cir. 1996) (habeas case) (citation omitted). The Highs have not demonstrated that they are entitled to counsel. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Highs' motion for appointment of counsel.

Lastly, the Highs argue that the district court judge should have disqualified himself because he was not impartial. We review the denial of a motion for disqualification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) for an abuse of discretion. *See Byrne v. Nezhat*, 261 F.3d 1075, 1099-100 (11th Cir. 2001). Under § 455(a), a district judge must "disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." *See* 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The Highs have not shown that the district court judge lacked impartiality in this case. Therefore § 455(a) did not require his recusal.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the district court denying the Highs' petition for writ of error *coram nobis* and the motions to appoint counsel and to recuse itself.

AFFIRMED.